On February 18, 2001, Robert Philip Hanssen was arrested and charged with committing espionage on behalf of the intelligence services of the former Soviet Union and its successors. He pled guilty to 15 counts of espionage on July 6, 2001 and was sentenced to prison without the possibility of parole. Hanssen is considered the most damaging spy in FBI history.
At the time of the arrest at a park in Vienna, Virginia, Robert Philip Hanssen, age 56, was clandestinely placing a package containing highly classified information at a pre-arranged, or “dead drop,” site for pick-up by his Russian handlers. Hanssen had previously received substantial sums of money from the Russians for the information he disclosed to them.
Hanssen was charged in a criminal complaint filed in Federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, with espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage, violations that carry a possible punishment of life in prison, and under certain circumstances, the death penalty. Following the arrest, FBI Agents began searching Hanssen’s residence, automobiles and workspace for additional evidence.
Detailed affidavits, filed in support of the criminal complaint and search warrants, provide a troubling account of how Hanssen first volunteered to furnish highly sensitive documents to KGB intelligence officers assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. The affidavits chronicle the systematic transfer of highly classified national security and counterintelligence information by Hanssen in exchange for diamonds and cash worth more than $600,000. Hanssen’s activities also have links to other, earlier espionage and national security investigations including the Aldrich Ames and Felix Bloch cases, according to the affidavit.
The affidavits allege that on over 20 separate occasions, Hanssen clandestinely left packages for the KGB, and its successor agency, the FSB, at dead drop sites in the Washington area. He also provided over two dozen computer diskettes containing additional disclosures of information. Overall, Hanssen gave the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of valuable documentary material, according to the affidavit.
The affidavits allege that Hanssen compromised numerous human sources of the U.S. Intelligence Community, dozens of classified U.S. Government documents, including “Top Secret” and “Codeword” documents, and technical operations of extraordinary importance and value. They also allege that Hanssen compromised FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources, methods and operations, and disclosed to the KGB the FBI’s secret investigation of Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, for espionage.
During the time of his alleged illegal activities, Hanssen was assigned to New York and Washington, D.C., where he held key counter-intelligence positions. As a result of his assignments, Hanssen had direct and legitimate access to voluminous information about sensitive programs and operations. As the complaint alleges, Hanssen effectively used his training, expertise and experience as a counter-intelligence agent to avoid detection, to include keeping his identity and place of employment from his Russian handlers and avoiding all the customary “tradecraft” and travel usually associated with espionage. The turning point in this investigation came when the FBI was able to secure original Russian documentation of an American spy who appeared to the FBI to be Hanssen, which subsequent investigation confirmed.
The investigation that led to the charges is a direct result of the combined and continuing FBI/CIA effort ongoing for many years to identify additional foreign penetrations of the U.S. intelligence community. The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI with direct assistance from the CIA, Department of State and the Justice Department, and represents an aggressive and creative effort which led to this counter-intelligence success.
In order to avoid the death penalty, Hanssen provided information about KGB and its successor, FSB. Based on the provided information, the Soviet spy services used a network of safe houses. This network included three safe houses (A, B, C). In these houses, specific operations were taking place: validation of information, analysis of information, duplication of analysed information. If an information is considered valid, then it is analysed further and then it is duplicated. If not, then the stages of information analysis and duplication are not realised. If an information arrives which has been already validated by different other sources, then it is directly analysed and duplicated. If the Soviet spies believe that someone monitors them, then they decide in which house or houses the operations will take place. For example, it is possible that all operations are realized in house A or one operation is done in house B and the remaining operations on C. It is also possible that part of the validation of information is realised in house B and the remaining in house C or A and the same applies for all the other operations.
At the time of the arrest at a park in Vienna, Virginia, Robert Philip Hanssen, age 56, was clandestinely placing a package containing highly classified information at a pre-arranged, or “dead drop,” site for pick-up by his Russian handlers. Hanssen had previously received substantial sums of money from the Russians for the information he disclosed to them.
Hanssen was charged in a criminal complaint filed in Federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, with espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage, violations that carry a possible punishment of life in prison, and under certain circumstances, the death penalty. Following the arrest, FBI Agents began searching Hanssen’s residence, automobiles and workspace for additional evidence.
Detailed affidavits, filed in support of the criminal complaint and search warrants, provide a troubling account of how Hanssen first volunteered to furnish highly sensitive documents to KGB intelligence officers assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. The affidavits chronicle the systematic transfer of highly classified national security and counterintelligence information by Hanssen in exchange for diamonds and cash worth more than $600,000. Hanssen’s activities also have links to other, earlier espionage and national security investigations including the Aldrich Ames and Felix Bloch cases, according to the affidavit.
The affidavits allege that on over 20 separate occasions, Hanssen clandestinely left packages for the KGB, and its successor agency, the FSB, at dead drop sites in the Washington area. He also provided over two dozen computer diskettes containing additional disclosures of information. Overall, Hanssen gave the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of valuable documentary material, according to the affidavit.
The affidavits allege that Hanssen compromised numerous human sources of the U.S. Intelligence Community, dozens of classified U.S. Government documents, including “Top Secret” and “Codeword” documents, and technical operations of extraordinary importance and value. They also allege that Hanssen compromised FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources, methods and operations, and disclosed to the KGB the FBI’s secret investigation of Felix Bloch, a foreign service officer, for espionage.
During the time of his alleged illegal activities, Hanssen was assigned to New York and Washington, D.C., where he held key counter-intelligence positions. As a result of his assignments, Hanssen had direct and legitimate access to voluminous information about sensitive programs and operations. As the complaint alleges, Hanssen effectively used his training, expertise and experience as a counter-intelligence agent to avoid detection, to include keeping his identity and place of employment from his Russian handlers and avoiding all the customary “tradecraft” and travel usually associated with espionage. The turning point in this investigation came when the FBI was able to secure original Russian documentation of an American spy who appeared to the FBI to be Hanssen, which subsequent investigation confirmed.
The investigation that led to the charges is a direct result of the combined and continuing FBI/CIA effort ongoing for many years to identify additional foreign penetrations of the U.S. intelligence community. The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI with direct assistance from the CIA, Department of State and the Justice Department, and represents an aggressive and creative effort which led to this counter-intelligence success.
In order to avoid the death penalty, Hanssen provided information about KGB and its successor, FSB. Based on the provided information, the Soviet spy services used a network of safe houses. This network included three safe houses (A, B, C). In these houses, specific operations were taking place: validation of information, analysis of information, duplication of analysed information. If an information is considered valid, then it is analysed further and then it is duplicated. If not, then the stages of information analysis and duplication are not realised. If an information arrives which has been already validated by different other sources, then it is directly analysed and duplicated. If the Soviet spies believe that someone monitors them, then they decide in which house or houses the operations will take place. For example, it is possible that all operations are realized in house A or one operation is done in house B and the remaining operations on C. It is also possible that part of the validation of information is realised in house B and the remaining in house C or A and the same applies for all the other operations.
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